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ABSTRACT 
 
In this paper, the author discusses two different beliefs of how institutional change to-
wards sustainability in agriculture and environment works: the institutional view and the 
evolutionary view. Both perspectives are studied in the context of restructuring the agri-
cultural sectors and rural environments in Central and Eastern European Countries 
(CEECs). The specific nature of the agri-environmental problem calls for specific insti-
tutions and may require a specific building process. Case study results are presented 
showing the effect of EU accession on institutional change towards sustainability in 
several CEECs. The results provide evidence that the quality of institutional change 
required for sustainability goes beyond the building of legislative frameworks and re-
quires more time than was envisaged by the roadmap to accession. Finally, the paper 
explores the role of social and human capital stocks in rural areas of CEECs outlining a 
number of differences in environmental governance in the agricultural sectors between 
various CEECs. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
The Central and Eastern European Countries (CEECs) are not merely subject to transi-
tion. Transition takes place in the context of EU accession and is part of evolutionary 
change, which are both relevant driving forces of institutional change. Transition in the 
agricultural sectors of the CEECs was brought about by liberalisation, privatisation and 
restructuring, i.e. elements of a market economy were introduced by building new insti-
tutional frameworks to change the political and economic systems. Accession refers to 
the forces of institutional change, which reflect the new institutionalist perspective and 
supports causality of institution building from top down. It starts from the belief that the 
government plays an important role in establishing and enforcing property rights that 
produce trust as well as in establishing peace between antagonistic groups (Levi, 1996). 
The thesis regards social capital1 as subordinate in reasoning and merely as a by-product 
of institutional incentives.  
 
From among the CEECs, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Po-
land, Slovakia and Slovenia successfully fulfilled the Copenhagen criteria2 for accession 
that on 13 December 2002 the European Council terminated the accession negotiations 
and scheduled these countries to enter the EU as full members on 1 May 2004. Acces-
sion involves the prioritisation of criteria that need to be fulfilled. In agriculture, the 
CEECs continue to be confronted with the multiple challenges of institutionalising mul-
tifunctionality – a problem that is closely connected with agri-environmental sustain-
ability and the requirement to develop adequate institutions and policies for the joint 
production of agricultural and environmental goods and services. This challenge goes 
beyond the “daily” difficulties of transforming the political and economic systems. 
Therefore, while adopting the acquis communautaire, environmental tasks have not 
always top political priority for CEE governments. Poland's resignation from agri-
environmental programmes to be introduced as part of SAPARD3 is just one example. 
Dealing with agri-environmental resource problems in the CEECs is more demanding 
than initially thought. Transferring the western legal and administrative frameworks is 
important but not sufficient for achieving sustainable agriculture in CEECs. 
 
The evolutionary process of institutional change, in contrast, can be related to the “so-
cial capital thesis” which states that social capital is necessary and sufficient for ex-
plaining societal outcomes (Ostrom, 2001). It is necessary because low institutional 
performance corresponds with low social capital. Evolution refers to forces of institu-
tional change, which can be explained by history and the legacies of the past. Institu-
tional reform paths which were taken (or not) are effected by the stock of material, 
physical, financial and human resources. For example Bulgaria and Romania, which 
were less successful in transforming their political and social systems, show the persis-
                                                 
1 Ostrom (2001) defines social capital as capital which is created by conscious effort and for which time 
is spent now, to increase productivity later. Social capital is the stock of shared understandings, norms, 
rules and expectations that groups bring to a recurrent activity which produces a flow of future income 
benefiting some and harming others, creating opportunities, and constraining events. 
2 In 1993, at the Copenhagen European Council, the Member States agreed that 'the associated countries 
in central and eastern Europe that so desire shall become members of the European Union. Accession 
would take place as soon as an applicant is able to assume the obligations of membership by satisfying 
the economic and political conditions required'. These are referred to as the Copenhagen criteria. 
3 Special Accession Programme for Agriculture and Rural Development 
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tence of an old state elite, which is used to neglecting environmental regulations” 
(Baker, 2001). Dobrinsky (2000) describes the transition crisis of Bulgaria as a result of 
the historically deeply rooted economic relations between Bulgaria and USSR and their 
collapse during transition. Opportunism and rent-seeking have been further obstacles to 
institutional change. They both originate from traditional codes of conduct and other 
informal institutions (e.g. described by Theesfeld (2001) for the Bulgarian CEESA case 
and by Peukert (1998) for Lithuania). 
 
The collapse of the communist party and the political transition to democratic govern-
ments committed to market-oriented reforms marked a specific regime change at the 
constitutional level (Haggard, 1997). However, this did not automatically alter the in-
formal and formal routines of society (Hedlund, 1999). Thus, the institutional environ-
ment existing after collapse of the communist party would also leave paths open to for-
mer centrally planned economies. 
 
A central question of this paper is, which forces shape institutional change for sustain-
ability4 with special reference to CEECs. The author explains the building of institutions 
and the resulting constitution of new types of environmental governance in agriculture 
and discusses the strategies and the challenges involved in this process.  
 
 
2 ACCESSION, EVOLUTION AND INSTITUTIONAL BUILDING 
In this chapter, the author applies Krishna’s (2002) analysis of social capital and the 
origins of development and democracy to the processes of accession and evolution in 
CEECs. Accession is largely discussed from the angle of the forces of institutional 
change, i.e. from the new institutionalist perspective supporting the causality of institu-
tion building from top down (Figure 1). It starts from the belief that governments play 
an important role in establishing and enforcing the property rights (thus enabling trust). 
Likewise, they are responsible for establishing and keeping peace between otherwise 
combative groups (Levi, 1996). The political structure determines behaviour and atti-
tudes of citizens and social capital may rather be caused by government institutions than 
by voluntary organisations. Levels of social capital can be altered through structural 
change. This thesis regards social capital as subordinate in reasoning; it is a mere by-
product of institutional incentives. From that the question raises, which institutional 
arrangements provide effective incentives for building trust and facilitating collective 
action. North (1990: 78) believes that the (formal) institutional framework is essential in 
shaping the acquisition of knowledge and maximising activities of organisation. How-
ever, he also concedes the importance of enforcement structures that come along with 
the formal institutional framework. The institutionalist perspective is supported by 
Knack and Keefer (1997) who revealed in a cross-country investigation that trust and 
norms of civic cooperation are stronger in countries with formal institutions that effec-
tively protect property and contract rights. Formal institutional rules, that constrain the 
government from acting arbitrarily, are associated with the development of cooperative 
norms and trust. Other authors (De Soto, 2000; North, 1981; North and Thomas, 1973) 
support this view and come to the conclusion that where states permitted citizens to as-
                                                 
4 Institutions of sustainability here refer to institutions that enable sustainable management of natural 
resources in the field of agriculture and the environment. 
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sociate freely and supported free entrepreneurship by instituting appropriate rules and 
legal systems, economic growth had been most progressive. 
 
Figure 1: The Institutionalist Perspective 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Krishna (2002) 
 
 
The institutionalist perspective is also supported by Bowles (1998) who (beside other 
authors) claims that policies, constitutions, markets and other economic institutions, 
apart from allocating goods and services, exert also substantial influence on the evolu-
tion of motivations, values, preferences and thereby “social capital” in large. The do so 
by  
(1) having framing effects. People make choices depending on whether the identical 
feasible set they face is generated by a market-like process or not;  
(2) controlling reward structures of markets. Paying people to perform a task, which 
they willingly might have done without payment, can undermine motivation. 
This kind of extrinsic market rewards prevents fundamental desires for feelings 
of self-determination (intrinsic rewards) which are associated with positive mo-
tivational effects; 
(3) effecting the evolution of norms (social capital). Economic institutions influence 
the structure of social interactions and thus effect the evolution of norms by al-
tering the returns to relationship-specific investments, such as reputation build-
ing. This may affect the kinds of sanctions that are applied in interactions and 
may change the likelihood of interaction of different kinds of people; 
(4) structuring the tasks of people and, consequently, affecting their capacities, val-
ues and psychological functioning; 
(5) altering cultural learning processes, the ways people acquire values and desires, 
rearing and schooling children as well as informal learning rules, e.g. conform-
ism. 
 
In the context of accession to the EU, forces of institutional change are those released 
by the need to comply with the acquis communautaire, the legislative body of the pre-
sent EU. Hereby, problems arise from the conflicts between formal and informal institu-
tions and the difficulties of matching formal requirements with conditions “on the 
ground” (see Chapter 2). At the beginning of the CEE transition process, optimism pre-
vailed assuming a more or less rapid implementation of numerous economic and politi-
cal reforms. According to the experiences made in several CEECs, however, transition 
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in terms of democratisation5 processes and the building of institutions has made less 
rapid progress than initially expected and has shown its own dynamic. Often suggested 
types of institutional reform were either replications of institutions operating in the EU 
and/or transaction cost minimising systems (Ibrahim and Galt, 2002). This approach 
paid little attention to accession-related aspects as well as evolutionary and path-
dependent aspects of the transition process in the new Member States and the govern-
ance problems that are likely to be produced. The speed of legislative harmonisation 
with the environmental acquis and the level of formal compliance differ considerably in 
these countries (European Commission, 2000). A general conflict generated by the con-
currence of accession and transition is the gap between formal compliance with the ac-
quis and the capacity to implement and enforce legislation, e.g. to coordinate specific 
agri-environmental policies. The present environmental acquis is a product of a political 
bargaining process in which the new members did not take part. 
 
The adoption of the acquis and legislative harmonisation in CEECs may be character-
ised as an important step for building institutions that will, among others, guarantee 
sustainability in agriculture and environment. However, legislative adoption and har-
monisation will remain symbolic as long as implementation and enforcement of the 
laws remain weak or absent. Policies can only be effectively implemented and enforced 
if downstream changes are made. Communities need to be equipped with more re-
sources and powers to strengthen their role in monitoring and enforcement of agri-
environmental schemes. Farmers need to be rewarded and motivated. New priorities and 
working methods are required for civil service agencies. Administrative capacities need 
to be improved and there needs to be concerted organisation of participation of all actors 
of the agri-environmental action scenario, including farmers, civil servants and politi-
cians. 
 
That means, accession is both a courtesy and an obstacle in the process of structural 
change. Only after formal harmonisation with the EU acquis, the new member states 
will make increased efforts to craft institutions that respond to and match with the spe-
cific needs of their environment, countryside and people. The Copenhagen Conference 
in December 2002 made clear that at present “harmony with the EU” is more important 
than “harmony with nature”. In many environmental areas, especially water quality, 
emissions, and waste treatment, implementation periods have been extended. But, al-
though CEECs were encouraged to include agri-environmental measures in their rural 
development plans (within SAPARD), the environmental issue did not receive high pri-
ority (Zellei, 2001). 
 
The evolutionary processes of institutional change can be related to the “social capital 
thesis” which states that social capital is necessary and sufficient for explaining societal 
outcomes. It is necessary because low institutional performance corresponds with low 
social capital. The thesis is largely based on a study by Putnam et al. (1993), who ana-
lyse the performance of regional governments in North and South Italy which were 
newly formed by a common set of legislative reforms and endowed with the same ad-
ministrative powers and relatively equal financial resources. Neither economic variables 
nor state structures mattered for explaining differences in institutional performance. The 
                                                 
5 Democratisation refers to the shift from one- to multi-party parliamentary systems with democratically 
elected and accountable governments. It requires the abandonment of the principle of state centralism in 
favour of decentralisation and the development of a civil society. 
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thesis argues that societies well supplied with social capital will be able to adapt to new 
organisational forms more readily than those with less social capital. Such societies will 
also be able to innovate organisationally since a high degree of sociability will allow a 
wide variety of social relationships to emerge (Fukuyama, 1995). This hypothesis, re-
ferred to as the “social capital thesis”, also stipulates that democratic institutions (such 
as good governance) cannot be built from top down. They must be built up in the every-
day traditions of trust and civic virtue among their citizens. This view assumes levels of 
trust as given and not subject to change. Social capital is regarded as exogenous to the 
institutional building process. 
 
Figure 2: The Social Capital Thesis 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Krishna (2002) 
 
 
In the Central and Eastern European context, evolution refers to a force of institutional 
change which can be explained by history and the legacies of the past. Institutional re-
form paths which were taken (or not) are affected by the stock of material, physical, 
financial and human resources. For example, Bulgaria and Romania which were less 
successful in transforming their political and social systems (and therefore do not be-
long to the first wave of accession countries), show the persistence of an old nomencla-
ture, “which have a history of eschewing environmental regulations and who have 
proved themselves to be the least public spirited section of society” (Baker, 2001). Do-
brinsky (2000) also describes the transition crisis of Bulgaria as a result of the deeply 
rooted economic relations between Bulgaria and USSR. The dependence of Bulgaria’s 
economy on trade with the Soviet economy constituted a major economic handicap. The 
CEECs have dealt with the challenges of establishing new institutions in agriculture and 
the environment with varying success and by adopting different strategies. One reason 
for this variation can be found in the legacies of central planning. The collapse of the 
communist party and the political transition to democratic governments committed to 
market-oriented reforms marked a specific regime change at the constitutional level 
(Haggard, 1997). However, this did not automatically alter the informal and formal rou-
tines of society (Hedlund, 1999). Thus the institutional environment that existed follow-
ing the collapse of the communist party also defined the paths open to former centrally 
planned economies. 
 
A third thesis assumes intermediary links between social capital and institutional per-
formance. The assumption is made that for social capital flow from grass-root associa-
tions and localised social networks to decision-making at higher levels, mediating agen-
cies are required which mediate the effects of social capital and translate it into collec-
tive action that is directed towards particular ends. Even where social capital is abun-
dant, interest representation may remain unresolved and social capital may remain dis-
connected from state institutions performance without the agency function of political 
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parties or other forms of mediating agency (e.g., mutual aid groups, labour groups). Un-
til interests are formulated and aggregated appropriately, the potential for collective 
action remains latent and unexplored. Whether associationism and dense networks of 
civil society weakens or strengthens democracy depends on the quality of the mediating 
links and the quality of the functions of mediating agencies. Specific knowledge and 
competencies are required to fulfil the tasks of the mediating agencies. These tasks 
range from coordinating performance and reviewing objectives in dynamic circum-
stances to building relations with key decision-makers of the state and the market. 
 
Figure 3: The Mediating Agency Perspective 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Krishna (2002) 
 
 
To sum up, one important lesson is that the institutions of social capital and institutional 
framing conditions are not connected linearly and causalities between both are not uni-
directional, e.g. trust defines its institutional environment and vice versa. Furthermore, 
neither social capital nor other institutional structures can be regarded as exogenous to 
the process of delivering societal performance. They are interrelated. The cases pre-
sented in the following chapter provide evidence for all three hypotheses. In CEECs, 
social capital patterns can consist of networks of few privileged actors who have good 
connections with political and market players. In the majority of rural communities such 
prominent actors are either absent or ageing, which makes it difficult for social capital 
to develop. Therefore, general and specific institutional performances for solving envi-
ronmental resource problems in agriculture are weak. The reform of structures and state 
institutions has made progress in all CEECs. However, the reform has often stuck at 
national and subnational levels without being able to provide incentives for collective 
action, which is a necessary precondition for solving environmental problems in agri-
culture. Societal performance has been disappointing in that respect. The reasons for the 
disappointing outcomes of solving environmental resource problems in agriculture are 
(1) unfavourable social capital patterns, (2) the absence of mediating agencies which 
translate social capital into collective action and (3) the institutional reforms of the legal 
and administrative system which are not far-reaching enough. 
 
3 LINKING INFORMAL AND FORMAL INSTITUTIONS 
The optimistic tendency at the beginning of the Central and Eastern European transition 
process assumed a more or less rapid implementation of numerous economic and politi-
cal reforms. After more than a decade of transition, we now know that democratisation6 
and the building of institutions for sustainability have been less rapid than initially ex-
                                                 
6 Democratisation refers to the shift from one- to multi-party parliamentary systems with a democratically 
elected and accountable government. It requires the abandonment of the principle of state centralism in 
favour of decentralisation and the development of a civil society. 
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pected. From an institutional economics perspective this can be explained by the vary-
ing frequencies of change of institutions at the different levels of society. Whereas the 
accession process has provided evidence that legislative frameworks and formal institu-
tions can change fast, the evolutionary forces of change need time. The question here is, 
how informal institutions, e.g. trust, norms, values, religion, etc. (Williamson, 2000) 
influence formal institutions, such as property rights and vice versa. In Figure 4, this 
question refers to the arrows between the “L1” and the “L2” level of institutional analy-
sis. North (1990) argues that the tensions between altered formal and persisting informal 
institutions produce outcomes that have important implications for the way economies 
change. Therefore, if we assume that the institutional framing conditions in CEECs are 
generally set, institutions at the embeddedness level also need to adapt if new forms of 
environmental governance in agriculture are sought. For changing institutions at the 
embeddedness level, processes of learning essential.  
 
Figure 4: Linking informal and formal institutions 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Adapted from Williamson, 2000 
 
 
In the following, I investigate potential interrelations between informal institutions and 
formal institutions. Hayek (1976) distinguishes between informal institutions, which 
belong to the realm of the “micro-cosmos of rules”, and formal institutions, which be-
long to the “macro-cosmos of rules”. Proceeding from Gatzweiler and Hagedorn (2002), 
who referred to the “adequate scope of action (for institutions) to evolve spontaneously” 
and the “mismatches among institutions at different levels”, evidence has to be provided 
of the effects of informal institutions on formal institutions in the process of institutional 
reform. Mummert (1999) elaborates two different types of institutional reforms. The 
first type resembles the scenario described by Gatzweiler and Hagedorn (2002) as “suf-
ficient scope for action”. It characterises a type of institutional reform referred to as 
“market order-oriented institutional reform”. This type of institutional reform aims at 
constituting economic systems that allow for the emergence of spontaneous market or-
der. The second type of institutional reform is “task-oriented” and aims at establishing 
formal institutions regulating specific tasks. Whereas the first type of institutions refer 
to public law which governs the hierarchical relationships between the state and private 
actors, the second type regulates the conduct of private actors towards each other, e.g. 
within organisations. Both types of institutional reform can be characterised as follows: 
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1) The “sufficient scope for action”-type of institutional reform (market order-
oriented): 
- Institutions allow for market coordination to evolve spontaneously, 
- Institutions do not regulate the fulfilment of certain tasks, 
- Institutions merely forbid the use of certain means, 
- Actors act according to individual preferences, 
- Individual actors are free to pursue their personal aims, 
- Rules do not prescribe any specific tasks, 
- Rules shall enable market processes to emerge spontaneously, 
- What matters is the comparative performance of the economic process. 
 
2) The “specific task-oriented” type of institutional reform: 
- Formal institutions are directed towards specific tasks, 
- Formal institutions need to be very specific, 
- Rules describe the ends actors need to pursue, 
- Formal institutions sometimes describe the means actors are allowed to use, 
- The efficiency of specific tasks has to be ensured, 
- What matters is how compliance to formal institutions is efficiently created. 
 
Sources of conflict between informal and formal institutions in both scenarios can arise 
when de jure and de facto rules do not match. This is the case with the institutional re-
form of type 1, when informal institutions contradict the formal framing institutions, 
e.g. when social norms restrict the exchange of non-pecuniary items like taking interest 
for lending money (Mummert, 1999: 12). Type 2 institutions have larger potential for a 
conflict between formal and informal institutions, e.g. formal rules that prescribe the 
reporting of criminals to state authorities and informal rules that prohibit to do so and 
instead prescribe to protect the criminal if he/she belongs to one’s own social group. 
The same informal rule may be effective when the risk of reporting is too high or when 
theft is a morally accepted act under conditions of general poverty. Another example 
conflicting formal and informal rules given by Mummert (1999: 9) is that job appoint-
ments in state bodies have to be strictly based on the qualification of candidates but may 
actually be made according to the traditional norms and conventions of nepotism.  
 
However, according to Mummert (1999), not the contradicting content between formal 
and informal institutions is a source of conflict, rather the missing subordination of in-
formal institutions into formal institutions. For type 1, the potential of conflict between 
formal and informal institutions is determined by the normative content of informal in-
stitutions. This normative content in informal institutions is decisive for support or non-
support of market processes, for the size of the group to which these informal institu-
tions apply and for the degree to which societies are fragmented. 
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Figure 5: Two types of institutional reform 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The less fragmented societies are, the greater will be the positive supporting effect of 
informal institutions on the market dynamics. In fragmented societies, e.g. many transi-
tion countries, economic processes will take place only within isolated groups. More-
over, in the context of institutions of sustainability (Gatzweiler et al., 2001), it is in the 
first line the legitimacy of formal institutions and the mechanisms by which the formal 
institutions are set and changed, that means the political institutions, the similarity of 
informal institutions with formal institutions, rather. Thus the central question is 
whether the actors have agreed on a particular set of political institutions. The extent to 
which contradicting informal institutions matter depends on the degree to which the 
cooperation problem of a society has been overcome and the likelihood of such consen-
sus is negatively related to society’s fragmentation. Therefore, the dualism of formal 
and informal institutions is unavoidable and leads to the situation in which we are con-
fronted with the task of mutual co-adaptation and where we are “living in two worlds at 
once” (Hayek, 1973/93): “We must constantly adjust our lives, thoughts and our emo-
tions, in order to live simultaneously within different kinds of order according to differ-
ent rules”. We must constantly adjust the “micro-cosmos rules” to the “macro-cosmos” 
rules to a certain degree. 
 
Wegner (1998) refers to the importance of informal and formal institutions in an attempt 
to explain the changing nature of environmental politics. He differentiates institutions 
according to their origin of emergence (to which governance structure they belong) and 
to their formal or informal nature and relates market external and market internal 
institutions to formal and informal institutions (Figure 6). Market external institutions 
(e.g., property rights) are institutions which are required for the functioning of a 
governance structure and which include (in case of formal institutions) market 
regulating policies (e.g. environmental directives, sanctions, licenses), as well as legally 
relevant conventions and customs. Market internal institutions are brought forth by the 
actors of the market (or another governance system) without involvement of the 
government. They facilitate transactions and/or controls of private contracts and include 
codes of conduct and conventions (in case they are informal institutions), model 
contracts and general terms and conditions (e.g., for business and trade) as well as usual 
business practices, habits, or customary law. 
 
Type 1: Spontaneous emergence of market 
processes 
Type 2: Specific task oriented rules 
Formal rules 
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Figure 6: Origin of emergence and formal or informal nature of institutions 
Institutions Origin of emergence formal informal 
Market internal 
General terms and conditions, 
model contracts 
Codes of conduct, custom, 
usual practice, custom-
ary/common law 
G
ov
er
na
nc
e 
Market external 
Policies, interventions, re-
strictions for private property 
rights 
Legally relevant conventions, 
customs 
Source: Adapted from Wegner (1998) 
 
 
This division is useful for explaining the changing nature of environmental governance, 
e.g. from a control-and-order or regulative governance to shared responsibility and co-
operative environmental governance (Holzinger et al., 2002). In environmental politics, 
internal and external institutions are being linked because of the various “externalities”. 
The market is not able to handle the various transactions between nature and the human 
actor. Therefore, interventions “give nature a voice or right” and provide regulations 
where market forces fail. In the light of increasing complexity of environmental phe-
nomena, the regulative approach, however, may not be sufficient. The socialist com-
mand and control regimes had some of the strictest environmental laws, which where 
largely inefficient due to lack of administration, implementation and enforcement ca-
pacities. Hence, sufficient social capital and a mature civil society have to develop be-
fore environmental governance will change. Such change would imply to rely increas-
ingly on informal institutions (e.g. customs, which prohibit people to throw away rub-
bish or pollute the landscape) in order to distribute responsibilities for a sustainable en-
vironment by cooperating with non-state actors, such as environmental NGOs. This 
process strongly requires the reliance on informal institutions that justify and legitimate 
a new mode of governance to evolve. 
 
4 CHALLENGES OF BUILDING INSTITUTIONS IN CEECS 
The following section provides examples for the challenge of building institutions (in 
agriculture and the environment) in ten CEECs. Many examples are taken from findings 
of the CEESA research project7. Others relate to general challenges of institutional 
building and problems related to the (deliberate) mismatch of formal and informal insti-
tutions and the search for new forms of environmental governance in agriculture. The 
crux of the problem for organisation and institutional building in agriculture and envi-
ronment is that initially actors at both national and local level had incomplete or no in-
formation about which institutions would be appropriate and most effective to solve the 
problems of environmental resource use in agriculture. Initially, actors did not have ex-
periences from similar situations in the past. To reduce this uncertainty, learning (from 
trial and error) (Popper, 1972/1992) is a crucial ingredient for building institutions. 
Human beings learn only with regard to problems or conflicts (Mantzavinos et al., 
2001) and therefore, problems should be seen as a chance to learn. Holling and Sander-
son (1996) investigated the role of adaptation in social and ecological systems and come 
                                                 
7 Central and Eastern European Sustainable Agriculture (CEESA) research project funded under the EU 
5th Framework Programme 
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to the conclusion that human systems of property rights built around deterministic eco-
system models. Therefore, they are not flexible in their application or crafted in light of 
the temporal or special demands of natural systems. Furthermore, they conclude that 
until modern human institutions are built on ecological dynamism and designed to flex 
with natural variability, their principle impact will be to impede nature, not to sustain it. 
The former “Soviet rule” in CEECs had produced societies that were built on the prin-
ciples of non-dynamism, non-flexibility, strict order and control – characteristics that 
probably contributed to the collapse of the system. But also the type of environmental 
governance practised by the EU in the 70s and early 80s can be characterised as a com-
mand-and-control or regulative approach (Holzinger et al., 2002). 
 
In contrast to CEECs, in western societies the regulative approach to environmental 
governance was not part of a centrally planned system and did not prohibit the participa-
tion of relevant stakeholders. The history of environmental governance has considerably 
changed since the 70s, it now involves “new instruments” which allow for shared re-
sponsibility, partnership and cooperation between state and non-state actors (Baker, 
2001). In contrast, the former centrally planned countries were characterised by closed, 
simple, and uni-directional decision-making processes, excluding those who were not 
members of the political club and rejecting constructive criticism which might have 
indicated system change. Structures of policy formulation were non-reflexive and in-
flexible, unable to react to change and learn from mistakes. The command and control 
systems were particularly weak in solving problems created in the environmental field. 
Environmental problems were easily put aside and sometimes solved by giving financial 
support. The growing inability to deal with the complex consequences of environmental 
destruction (and loss of social cohesion) seemed to be a result of the shortcomings of 
simplistic regimes that largely excluded the people from the processes of decision mak-
ing and institutional change. By excluding learning mechanisms from the policy cycle, 
these regimes were obviously unable to initiate necessary innovation.  
 
In the former socialist countries, individuals had neither access to specific ecological 
information nor proper opportunities for social learning: processes as communication 
was deliberately disturbed by, e.g. limited freedom of speech or censorship of mass me-
dia. Providing financial or technological support for ecological conflict resolution in 
Hungary is just one example of the state’s attempt to control the growth of social capital 
and keep it in the ideologically predefined role8. As a result, problems were solved (or 
better put aside) without fair comment, protest or active participation by the civil soci-
ety. Building of a civil society itself was thereby obstructed. The attempt to abolish the 
differences between the city and the village (one of the aims of Lenin’s socialist cultural 
revolution) during the socialist transformation is another far more striking example. As 
a result, traditional social relationships of rural societies, systems of traditional norms, 
values and other social constraints, human networks and local communities were sys-
tematically destroyed, broken up and rearranged (Persanyi, 1990) (Annex, Box 1). 
 
During the socialist era, people built social networks and came to own arrangements 
within a political system that was obstinate and could not be easily changed from bot-
tom up. Social networks, such as the family or a circle of friends, plaid an essential role. 
Under socialism, a system of large-firm paternalism evolved, which was specific for 
rural areas in the GDR since the 1970s (Laschewski and Siebert, 2002). Beyond produc-
                                                 
8 The state expected environmental organisations to cooperate but not to protest against its policy. 
GATZWEILER – Patterns of Institutional Change for Sustainability 
 
Sustainable Agriculture in Central and Eastern European Countries (CEESA) 
Discussion Paper No. 16 
15
tion and employment, the large agricultural firms provided a wide range of activities, 
such as administrative and social services, building and construction, food processing, 
technical and cultural services and transportation (BMELF, 1991). Thus, they run child 
nurseries, canteens, holiday homes and camps as well as clubs (e.g. for horse riding) 
Furthermore, they often initiated cultural events for the community (Zierold, 1997) and 
social events for pensioners.  
 
During transition, a sense of disorientation and low communal morale among the 
people of many rural areas in East Germany and CEE countries was brought about by 
the radical political changes, the collapse of the collective and state farms, unemploy-
ment and other disruptions (European Parliament, 1999). Finally, there has been the 
feeling that social engagement would not be publicly accepted and honoured, but would 
in many cases be even regarded as attempt to "search for individual profits" or as "sup-
port and stabilisation of the socialist system" (Rodewald, 1994). Brauer (2001) argues 
that the call for self-reliance and egoism immediately after unification has also contrib-
uted to the fact that collective action has got a negative notion. Theesfeld (2001) reports 
similar attitudes from rural areas in Bulgaria, where collective action in the irrigation 
sector of Plovdiv has received a bad image and a barrier for people to collectively get 
involved in building new irrigation institutions. 
 
In the early 1990s, most CEE countries established new constitutions and fundamental 
rights were granted. Despite these rights and general provisions of public participation, 
a void has remained between the legislative framework and the practice of public 
participation. This is especially evident with respect to procedures to facilitate public 
involvement in law- and rule-making and in the drafting of policies, programs and plans 
at national and local levels. Environmental problems are a matter of public concern, and 
a majority of people in CEECs are willing to invest into the quality of future environ-
ments even at the expense of present wealth. However, there is great uncertainty about 
the potential ways of solving these problems. Hungarians and Macedonians, e.g., are 
convinced that NGOs provide the most efficient organisational structure for solving 
environmental problems, whereas Romanians think that local governments are the best 
organisational and institutional solution to environmental problems (REC, 1998). The 
institutional void between legislative framework and local participation is not only due 
to cut off or missing public participation. Different velocities of change can have simi-
lar impacts. In many CEECs, social learning at local levels could not keep pace with 
rapid changes occurring at national and international levels. For the management of 
natural resources, this discrepancy was fatal as it prevented systematic management by 
local authorities. Institutional void refers to a phenomenon that is typical for CEECs in 
transition, especially in the light of EU accession. Institutional void describes a situation 
in which change takes place at the administrative and legislative levels and at the very 
local levels of society, leaving the connecting meta-levels of institutional building 
empty. The non-existence of farmer organisations, environmental NGOs or other envi-
ronmental action groups provide evidence for this void.  
 
4.1 THE POLISH CEESA CASE - REPUDIATING NITRATE POLLUTION FOR THE SAKE OF 
FORMAL HARMONISATION? 
The Polish case is a good example for a strategy of defining down (or repudiating) an 
environmental problem for the sake of compliance with the environmental acquis of the 
EU. It illustrates how the accession negotiations have transformed the political status of 
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the farm pollution problem in Poland. The Polish case analysed the problems with the 
transposition and implementation of requirements imposed by Directive 91/676/EEC 
known as the Nitrate Directive. The SAPARD Programme offered funds for the imple-
mentation of the Nitrate Directive. In March 1998, the European Union officially 
launched accession negotiations with Poland and the results of the subsequent screening 
process confirmed the assumption that Poland would not be able to implement the re-
quirements of the Directive up to the provisional date of accession. Therefore Poland 
requested a grace period of 8 years. The EU, in response, encouraged Poland to recon-
sider the request and to establish an implementation programme, since it considered the 
transposition of the environmental acquis into national legislation a major task that 
should be given priority. It suggested to implement the Directive within four years. In 
spite of the earlier assessment, Poland decided that, with the view to current water pol-
lution levels, it would not be justified to designate the areas vulnerable to nitrate pollu-
tion of agricultural origin. Hence, an implementation programme was not prepared. 
However, the Institute of Meteorology and Water Management prepared a report on 
“The designation of zones vulnerable to nitrate pollution from agricultural sources” stat-
ing no serious problem of nitrate pollution from agriculture and confirming the quality 
of Polish waters to be generally better than that of most EU countries (Karaczun, 2002). 
 
In their attempt to “harmonise” with the EU, discrepancies such as the different storage 
capacities proposed by Polish and EU law (6- and 4-month capacities, respectively) do 
not seem to receive much attention. Karaczun (2002) concludes that instead of negotiat-
ing on specific issues in which both sides try to solve the environmental challenges of 
accession, position-based negotiations are carried out in which both parties endeavour 
to achieve superiority. “This might lead to the situation that Poland tries to find a legal 
interpretation” allowing to proclaim the fulfilment of all accession requirements in this 
field. These diplomatic and rhetoric sleights, however, cannot belie the continuing lack 
of coordination and cooperation between local and central authorities and between the 
relevant ministries as well as the missing training capacities for civil servants, farmers 
and trainers in the field. 
 
4.2 THE CEESA CASES IN LITHUANIA AND SLOVAKIA - CHALLENGES OF IMPLEMENT-
ING THE NITRATE DIRECTIVE 
In light of accession to the EU, the actual environmental problem targeted by the Nitrate 
Directive in Poland, Lithuania and Slovakia was often perceived as existing merely in 
terms of transposing legislative frameworks or it was defined down to a temporary and 
subordinate problem. The average limits on nitrogen use and the density of livestock set 
out in the directive are lower in these (and other) CEE countries. This was explained by 
the decrease in productivity (especially the decreased number of livestock) after 1990 
and the general path of extensification from which the accession countries came.   
 
This example nicely illustrates the evolution of a law which was meant to restrict the 
environmental impact as a result of intensive agriculture intensive agriculture in the 
EU15 and that is now prescribed for the new member countries that have very diverse 
environmental and agricultural starting conditions. Because of the generally low pro-
duction intensity in CEE agriculture (during transition), it was assumed that there would 
be no insurmountable problems with the Nitrate Directive before accession. The efforts 
before accession, however, concentrated on formally complying with the acquis com-
munautaire. The implementation of the Nitrate Directive shortly before accession is 
GATZWEILER – Patterns of Institutional Change for Sustainability 
 
Sustainable Agriculture in Central and Eastern European Countries (CEESA) 
Discussion Paper No. 16 
17
therefore more an issue of technical transposition than a serious debate on real environ-
mental mitigation.  The abandonment of the long transition periods, which were initially 
applied for and are necessary for solving environmental problems, provide further evi-
dence.  
 
Another problem evident in all CEE countries is the lack of financial resources. Funds 
provided by pre-accession programmes are very limited. Farmers, for instance, are not 
able to finance the construction of manure tanks and banks are unwilling to provide 
loans for “unproductive” investments in storage facilities and other technical equipment. 
 
Physical environment and farm structure 
In Lithuania, the case study was carried out in the Northern Karst region, which covers 
one fifth of the entire country. After privatisation of the former large state and collective 
farms, the farm structure became highly fragmented with great differences in farm size, 
specialisation, and levels of education.  
 
In Slovakia the large-scale farm structure continued to exist after land restitution. The 
Slovakian case study was made in one of the most productive agricultural areas of Slo-
vakia: Corn Island. The area is very rich in groundwater resources. Eighty percent of the 
territory is under agricultural production and most crops are irrigated. 
 
Policies, institutions and governance 
In Lithuania, laws for the protection of water have been in force already since 1972. 
Since the mid-70s, protected water management zones have been declared. In 2001, the 
Agricultural Ministry and the Environmental Ministry issued a joint order as part of the 
implementation of the Nitrate Directive regulating the density of animals per hectare of 
agricultural land. Administrative penalties for visible actions have been effectively en-
forced. The advisory service that had existed during socialism was rebuilt during the 
1990s. Small farmers, however, need better access to information and training. It is en-
visaged to designate the entire country a nitrate vulnerable zone (following the Danish 
advice). Such approach implies a commitment to uniform environmental standards 
across sectors.  
 
Also in Slovakia, laws for the protection of water have already been in force since 1973. 
In 1978, the Corn Island area was declared a protected water management area. In 2002, 
the New Water Act was adopted, which defines storage, manipulation and application of 
mineral and organic fertilisers as well as appropriate soil cultivation standards. It also 
limits the number of animals per land unit. As compared to Lithuania and Latvia, the 
continuity of enforcement mechanisms has been higher in Slovakia as the farming 
community and farm structures were less fragmented after privatisation. During transi-
tion, controls and enforcements of the laws were largely abandoned due to the economic 
depression. However, the current Slovakian water monitoring system is very compre-
hensive and meets EU requirements. A water-monitoring network has been existing 
since the 1960s. However as in Poland, there is hardly any agricultural advisory service, 
especially for small farmers. 
 
GATZWEILER – Patterns of Institutional Change for Sustainability 
Sustainable Agriculture in Central and Eastern European Countries (CEESA) 
Discussion Paper No. 16 
18
4.3 THE CEESA CASES IN CZECH REPUBLIC, SLOVENIA AND HUNGARY - INCHOATE 
AGRI-ENVIRONMENTAL GOVERNANCE 
The CEESA cases in Slovenia, Czech Republic and Hungary dealt with biodiversity 
issues and the implementation of agri-environmental schemes in protected areas. All 
countries show specific and general problems with the governance of agri-
environmental programmes. For instance, the lack of cooperation and coordination 
among agricultural and environmental ministries and the landscape protection authori-
ties are crosscutting sources of conflict -- a problem which has its roots in the tradition-
ally strict division of ministry responsibilities (Ministry of Agriculture and Ministry of 
Environment) and their austere, hierarchical design. Depending on the hierarchical 
structure of authority within and between these bodies, the traditions in decision mak-
ing, and depending on the location of most financial resources, the cooperation and par-
ticipation among the different actors varies considerably. Administrative capacities re-
quire improvement; for example, farmers and NGOs should coordinate decision-making 
in order to bring about a better functioning governance which is less “top-down” - for 
the benefit of the people as well as the environment. 
 
Physical environment 
The Czech case deals with the challenges of landscape conservation and management in 
the White Carpathian region of eastern Moravia, on the border to Slovakia. The region 
is characterised by small, dispersed villages and pastoral agriculture including extensive 
cattle and sheep grazing. Until the mid-twentieth century, low input farming was com-
mon, contributing to the evolution of bio-diverse landscapes - a mosaic of forests, pas-
tures and some of the species-richest meadows in Europe. The area is characterised by a 
dual structure in farm size. On the one hand, about 50% of the land is managed by a 
handful of large commercial enterprises, whereas, on the other hand, 33% of the agricul-
tural land is operated by smallholders who own less than 10 hectares.  
 
The Slovenian case deals with the agri-environmental scheme in an area designated as a 
regional park. In Slovenia the total share of less favoured area (LFA) accounts for 
84.3% of the total surface area and 78.4% of Slovenia’s agricultural land. The country is 
characterised by hilly and mountainous areas, which make up 70 % of the total area. It 
also has a rather long tradition of policies for less favoured areas. The case study area is 
an upland natural forest with traditional pastoral farming, which has been proposed as a 
regional park. The farmland has over centuries been in private ownership of small-scale 
family farmers. 
 
The Hungarian case investigates the agri-environmental scheme in a protected land-
scape area. Traditional grazing practices in this hilly region have shaped diverse grass-
land habitats. After 1990 the number of grazing animals decreased, threatening the 
maintenance of the landscape and its biodiversity. 
 
Rural population 
The Czech case describes the effects of out-migration. If people living in the country-
side find a job in the city, they will commute or move to the cities. There are a large 
number of smallholdings, which mainly produce for self-consumption. Small farms of-
ten express a strong attachment to the landscape and are voluntarily involved in envi-
ronmental and landscape improvement activities 
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The rural population in Slovenia lives under conditions similar to those in Austria or 
northern Italy and can therefore be characterised as exceptional for CEECs. Many farm-
ers work part-time, earning their main income from non-agricultural activities (e.g. tour-
ism and crafts). There has been no considerable depopulation of the areas after 1990. In 
Hungary, the area chosen for a case study consists of many small subsistence farmers 
with no off-farm income alternatives. In light of the fragmented farm structures pro-
duced by the privatisation of land, people are more concerned about their survival than 
about the environment (in contrast to the Czech case). In Hungary we can also observe 
out-migration and ageing of the rural population. 
 
Policies, institutions and governance 
In the Czech case, the agri-environmental programmes are developed in preparation for 
EU accession. Farmers are eligible to receive LFA support but are unfamiliar with agri-
environmental incentives. Various compensation payments have been introduced by the 
Ministry of Agriculture (MoA) and Ministry of Environment (MoE), with those from 
the MoA being highest. Subsidies are only available for farmers with two hectares 
within and more than five hectares outside of the protected area. Small farmers seek 
additional suckler cow premiums, pasture-based livestock premiums and payments for 
ecological farming. There are coordination problems regarding the complementarity of 
the different subsidies from the MoA and MoE. NGOs are very active in mediating be-
tween farmers and authorities and in providing additional information on biological 
farming practices. 
 
In Slovenia, there has been a LFA support system since 1975. The Slovenian Agri-
Environment Programme (SAEP) was established on a pilot scale as early as in 2001. 
Farmers receive LFA support (49 EURO/ha) and are eligible for agri-environmental 
payments, as well as other subsidies. The local population of Triglav, however, wants to 
be more involved in the designation process of the national park. 
 
In Hungary, agri-environmental programmes are currently being developed in prepara-
tion for EU accession. Most protected areas are state owned. The state leases land to 
farmers under conditions of rather strict environmental management prescriptions. Fi-
nancial incentives and compensation payments for LFA have not been paid yet. The 
National Park Directorate indirectly supports the farmers by issuing preferential rents 
for the farmers living in the protected landscape area. The approach towards the farmers 
is prescriptive and regulative. Cooperation between farmers and authorities needs im-
provement, and the strict environmental regulations cannot be implemented or enforced. 
 
4.4 THE BULGARIAN CEESA CASE - ROAD TO ACCESSION OR TO PERDITION?  
The Bulgarian case is about rebuilding the irrigation system in the Plovdiv agricultural 
area, which was destroyed during the transition period. Following privatization, a large 
number of small landowners had to be supplied with water from the irrigation system; 
property rights redefined; and responsibilities, rights, and duties changed and adapted to 
new conditions. Privatisation and restitution have led to uncertainty about the organisa-
tions in charge of managing local-level irrigation works. As a result of decollectivisa-
tion, the state-owned irrigation company has to deal with a large number and different 
types of agricultural producers, instead with agricultural cooperatives in the past. Con-
sequently, many internal irrigation canals were no longer maintained and thus deterio-
rated. Cropping structures have been modified – from vegetables to less water-intensive 
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crops. Property regimes have changed, leading to fragmented landscapes with a large 
number of small plots. Owing to this process the new ownership structures did no 
longer match the original large-scale physical structure of the irrigation systems. The 
destructive physical effects on the internal irrigation systems were amplified by vanish-
ing social structures and conflicts with minorities at the community level. Confronted 
with the desolate situation in the rural areas many young people left the villages in 
search for work in the cities. Former human networks disbanded and “social mecha-
nisms” collapsed. The practice of irrigation water appropriation is chaotic and domi-
nated by opportunism and the “rule of the fist” instead of “rule of law”. Water users 
who order water cannot rely on its delivery and, when delivered, it arrives without no-
tice. Those at the front of the irrigation canal are served first; often no water remains for 
those at the end. Farmers in some villages guard their own fields in case water is deliv-
ered. Once water arrives in the channels, they must ensure that the flow is not diverted 
to another field.  
 
Agricultural advisory services are missing or ineffective and farmer organizations play a 
negligent role in solving the great number of conflicts surrounding water. In the Bulgar-
ian irrigation sector there are no commonly agreed-upon rules, and behavior such as free 
riding and rent seeking dominates. Therefore, as long as economic farming conditions 
are unstable and basic conditions – such as access to information – do not exist, there is 
no fertile ground on which good governance can grow and institutions of sustainable 
irrigations systems can evolve.  Both forces of institutional change – the evolutionary 
and the new institutionalist perspective – seem to have failed in the Bulgarian irrigation 
case (Penov, 2002). 
 
4.5 THE LATVIAN CEESA CASE – DRAINAGE SYSTEMS AND THE ENVIRONMENT 
Latvia has a long history of land drainage. The first drainage systems were built in the 
mid-19th century. Land drainage, as a tool to manage groundwater levels in humid 
zones, plays an important role in agriculture. During socialism the drainage systems 
were managed and maintained by the state, but the effectiveness of the system did not 
play a major role. As a result of land privatisation the area of abandoned land has in-
creased, soil fertility has declined and the farm structure has become increasingly frag-
mented. Reduced liming has led to acidification of agricultural soils.  
 
As a result of insufficient maintenance, drainage systems have been destructed and soil 
moisture conditions have been disturbed. The loss of soil fertility has contributed to a 
general decrease in agricultural production and a shift from state and collective enter-
prises to small-scale and subsistence farming. The public opinion still prevails, backed 
by laws (law of land reclamation), that the former state drainage system should be main-
tained in the public interest. This is no problem for large polder systems and main ca-
nals, which are still state-owned. However, the smaller drainage constructions are now 
in public or private ownership and the farmers are responsible for the drainage canals 
which are located on their own land. Conflicts with drainage system maintenance occur 
when canals in public ownership are not maintained by cooperation of several landown-
ers so that private upstream fields may get waterlogged or even damaged from flooding 
(wet pits). The same problem may occur when a private owner at a downstream plot of 
a canal avoids maintenance, thus adversely affecting his neighbourhood. Recommenda-
tions given by national experts (e.g. Code of Good Agricultural Practice for Latvia) are 
very normative. They focus on a legal system and a corresponding system for monitor-
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ing and sanctioning. Even different kinds of cooperation and collective action are re-
garded as necessary (maybe an imitation of the West) in order to solve problems, al-
though actors cannot draw on previous experiences of successful cooperation, for in-
stance, in the frame of drainage associations. The latter are more or less unknown in 
Latvia. 
 
5 CONCLUSIONS 
The cases investigated in Central and Eastern European countries within the CEESA 
research project were found to be highly diverse in terms of the topics identified, the 
resource problem areas focused on, the perspectives analysed, and the methods applied. 
Despite the indisputable success of most countries in transforming their economic and 
political systems, it has become clear that the environment is not the sole gauge for 
measuring achievements towards sustainable agriculture. The latter, in general, has only 
be one among many other aims of the transition process that prevails up to date and will 
continue even after finalisation of the accession process. 
 
The question remains open for debate whether the decline of post-socialist agricultural 
production (especially in livestock farming and in the agricultural input sector) has re-
duced environmental pressures to a greater extent than did deliberate efforts at crafting 
institutions for sustainable agriculture. Institutional change needs time. The time 
granted for changing the CEE political and economic systems and fulfilling the Copen-
hagen criteria has been limited and environmental criteria have not been given priority. 
It was argued that if accession would not happen up to a certain deadline, the “historical 
window of opportunity would shut”. Therefore, accession took place at its own pace, 
regardless of the time actually needed for building adequate institutions for governing 
the interactions between people and their natural environment in agriculture. However, 
despite the achievements of this type of institutional change (e.g., legislative harmonisa-
tion) the informal and formal institutions of sustainability in CEE societies were not 
automatically altered. In addition, evolutionary processes of institutional change are 
needed to achieve environmental goals in agriculture.  
 
The patterns of evolutionary agri-environmental governance are determined by the de-
gree of homogeneity of both physical (farm structure etc.) and social conditions.  
- The complexity of the initial problem situation  
- The administrative capacities and other resources are available for solving the 
problems 
- The number and variance of actors needed to solve the problem situation 
- The relevance of “friction” likely to be caused as a result of the necessity to co-
operate  
- Rivalry among stakeholders  
- Fragmentation of the ownership and farming structure after privatization  
- Availability of potential non-state actors for sharing environmental responsibil-
ity  
 
The governance response to more complex and less homogeneous variables of institu-
tional change has been different. In Hungary, e.g., governance solutions were mainly 
hierarchical and regulatory. The state was the sole landowner, prescribing strict regula-
tions for land management without being able to compensate the farmers. This approach 
may have minimised transaction costs as it reduced costs for coordination among differ-
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ent authorities and different actors. It remains questionable, however, whether such pro-
tective and hierarchical type of governance yields environmentally sound and socially 
acceptable results.  
 
In contrast, the Czech case shows the difficulties in environmental governance when 
taking into account not only the complex physical conditions but also the requirements 
of coordination and cooperation among the different actors involved. Although there is 
private ownership of land in protected areas, power is redistributed to the large enter-
prises by renting land from a large number of small landowners and paying very little 
rent. The coordination problem involves these large enterprises, different governmental 
authorities, small farmers and NGOs. Despite higher costs for coordination, people are 
better motivated and integrated in the process of decision-making, they receive incen-
tive payments and they are willing to invest into their rural environment even without 
direct benefits. There are more elements of market governance and civil society in the 
Hungarian case than in Hungary. Similarly, the other cases vary in terms of a function-
ing governance structure for agri-environmental coordination. 
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